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Abstract
We formalize the argument that political disagreements can be
traced to a “clash of narratives”. Drawing on the “Bayesian Networks”
literature, we model a narrative as a causal model that maps actions
into consequences, weaving a selection of other random variables into
the story. An equilibrium is defined as a probability distribution over
narrative-policy pairs that maximizes a representative agent’s antic-
ipatory utility, capturing the idea that public opinion favors hopeful
narratives. Our equilibrium analysis sheds light on the structure of
prevailing narratives, the variables they involve, the policies they sus-
tain and their contribution to political polarization.
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1 Introduction
It has become commonplace to claim that political disagreements can be
traced to a “clash of narratives”. Going beyond differences in preferences or
information, divergent opinions emanate from fundamentally different inter-
pretations of reality that take the form of stories. Consequently, a policy
gains in popularity if it can be sustained by an effective narrative; and politi-
cians and public-opinion makers spend considerable energy on trying to shape
the popular narratives that surround policy debates.
There are countless expressions of this idea in popular and academic dis-
course. For instance, a recent New Yorker profile of a former aide of President
Obama begins with the words “Barack Obama was a writer before he became
a politician, and he saw his Presidency as a struggle over narrative”.1 Like-
wise, two public policy professors write in an LSE blog that “there can be
little doubt then that people think narratives are important and that craft-
ing, manipulating, or influencing them likely shapes public policy”. They
add that narratives simplify complex policy issues “by telling a story that
includes assertions about what causes what, who the victims are, who is
causing the harm, and what should be done”.2
In this paper we offer a formalization of the idea that battles over pub-
lic opinion involve competing narratives. Of course, the term “narrative”
is vague and any formalization inevitably leaves many of its aspects outside
the scope of investigation. Our model is based on the idea that in the con-
text of public-policy debates, narratives can be regarded as causal models
that map actions to consequences. Following the literature on probabilistic
graphical models in Statistics, Artificial Intelligence and Psychology (Cowell
et al. (1999), Sloman (2005), Pearl (2009)), we represent such causal models
by directed acyclic graphs (DAGs).
In our model, what defines a narrative is the variables it incorporates
and the way these are arranged in the causal mapping from actions to conse-
quences. For instance, consider a debate over US trade policy and its possible
1See https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/18/witnessing-the-obama-
presidency-from-start-to-finish.
2See http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2018/07/18/mastering-the-art-of-the-narrative-using-stories-to-shape-public-policy/.
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implications for employment in the local manufacturing sector. Suppose that
the public has homogenous preferences over actions and consequences; dis-
agreements only arise from different beliefs. The DAG
trade policy → imports from China → employment (1)
represents a narrative that weaves a third variable (imports from China) into
a causal story that regulates the action-consequence mapping which is the
subject of the policy debate.
The nodes in the DAG represent variables (not the values they can take),
and the links represent perceived direct causal effects (but not the sign or
magnitude of these effects). The variables are coarse-grained, such that the
narrative does not describe an individual historical episode; instead, it can
be used to interpret a wealth of historical episodes. It alerts the public’s
attention to long-run correlations between adjacent variables along the causal
chain and invites a causal interpretation of these correlations.
We refer to the narrative represented by (1) as a “lever narrative” because
it regards imports from China as a “lever” - i.e., as an endogenous variable
that is influenced by policy and in turn influences the target variable. In-
tuitively, this narrative supports a protectionist policy: imports from China
are negatively correlated with both protectionism and employment in the
local manufacturing sector, and it is natural to interpret these correlations
in terms of the causal chain (1). But while the support is intuitive, it is illu-
sory if the narrative is false - e.g. if the actual correlation between imports
from China and employment is due to the confounding effect of exogenous
technological change.
The following is another example of a lever narrative in the context of a
foreign policy debate. The policy question is whether to impose economic
sanctions on a rival country with a hostile regime. The public considers desta-
bilizing the regime a desirable outcome. A lever narrative that intuitively
gives support to a hawkish policy is
sanction policy → economic situation in rival country → regime stability
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The following is a lever narrative that involves a different “lever”:
sanction policy → nationalism in rival country → regime stability
This narrative intuitively supports a dovish policy because nationalistic sen-
timents in the rival country are positively correlated with the stability of its
regime and potentially ameliorated by a soft stance on sanctions.
Thus, two narratives may have the same “lever” structure but differ in
the selection of variables that function as “levers”, and consequently in the
policies they support. Likewise, the same variable can be assigned different
roles in the causal scheme. For instance, the following is a foreign-policy
narrative that treats nationalism as an exogenous variable:
sanction policy → regime stability ← nationalism in rival country
We refer to a narrative with this structure as a “threat/opportunity narra-
tive”, because it regards the third variable that it weaves into the story as
an external variable that the policy responds to rather than influences it. In
the context of our foreign-policy example, this narrative intuitively favors a
hawkish policy because it regards the prospect of waning nationalism in the
rival country as an opportunity for toppling its regime, which tough sanction
policy can exploit.
Thus, foreign-policy narratives can differ in the variables they weave into
the story or in the role that these variables play in the causal mapping from
actions to consequences. This is akin to a dramatist’s decision about which
events to include as ingredients in a story and how to construct a plot around
them. Different narratives can generate different beliefs regarding the map-
ping from actions to consequences - and therefore lend support to different
policies - because they alert the audience’s attention to correlations between
different sets of variables and manipulate its causal interpretation of these
correlations. A public-opinion maker who wishes to promote a particular
policy will therefore devise a narrative that “sells” it most effectively.
Our objective is to define a notion of equilibrium in public-policy debates,
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in which narrative-policy pairs vie for dominance in public opinion. When
the public adopts a narrative, we assume - following Spiegler (2016) - that it
constructs a belief over the narrative’s variables, by factorizing their objective
joint distribution according to the so-called “Bayesian-Network factorization
formula”, and it relies on this belief to evaluate policies. This factorization
captures the notion of fitting the causal model to objective data. A wrong
causal model can induce a distorted belief regarding the mapping from actions
to consequences.
To summarize the first ingredient of our model, a narrative is an arrange-
ment of selected variables in a causal model (formalized as a DAG), combined
with a rule for generating beliefs from such a causal model. But what hap-
pens when the public confronts competing narratives? Here we invoke the
second ingredient of our model, which is the idea that the public selects be-
tween narrative-policy pairs “hedonically” - i.e., according to the indirect
anticipatory utility that each one of them generates.
The idea that people adopt distorted beliefs to enhance their anticipatory
utility has several precedents in the literature (Akerlof and Dickens 1982),
Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), Spiegler (2008)). Recently, Montiel Olea
et al. (2018) studied the notion of “competing models” in a very different
context of linear regression models that differ in the set of variables they
admit, and assumed that prevailing models maximize the indirect expected
utility they induce when estimated against a random sample. In the con-
text of public-policy debates, we find it particularly natural to assume that
the public will be drawn to hopeful narrative-policy pairs. Precisely because
individuals have little influence over public policy, they incur negligible de-
cision costs when indulging in hopeful fantasies. It is therefore realistic to
assume that anticipatory feelings are a powerful driving force behind political
positions.
Based on these two ingredients, we define equilibrium as a steady-state
distribution over narrative-policy pairs, such that every element in the sup-
port maximizes a representative agent’s anticipatory utility. Why we do refer
to this concept as “equilibrium” instead of plain maximization? The reason
is that the action frequencies that are induced by a given distribution over
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narrative-policy pairs can affect belief (and hence the anticipatory utility)
that each narrative generates. This feedback effect is fundamental to the
idea of beliefs that are generated by fitting a wrong causal model to objec-
tive long-run data (see Spiegler (2016)), and it is what creates the need for
an equilibrium approach to the notion of competing narratives.
We employ our equilibrium concept to explore several questions: Which
narratives are attached to various policies - that is, what is their causal
structure and what kind of variables do they involve? Can we account for
divergent popular policies by the notion of competing narratives? Are swings
between conflicting dominant narratives fundamental to battles over public
opinion? The results we present demonstrate the formalism’s potential to
shed light on the role of narratives in political debates.
Related literature
The idea that people think about empirical regularities in terms of “causal
stories” that can be represented by DAGs has been embraced by psycholo-
gists of causal reasoning (e.g. Sloman (2005), Sloman and Lagnado (2015)).
Spiegler (2016) adopted this idea as a basis for a model of decision making
under causal misperceptions. In Spiegler (2016), a decision maker forms a
subjective belief by fitting a subjective causal model to objective long-run
data. This continues to be a building block of the model in this paper, which
goes beyond it in two major directions: first, the collection of variables that
can appear in a causal model of a given size is not fixed but selected en-
dogenously; and second, we assume “hedonic” selection between competing
causal models.
We are aware of at least three papers in economics that draw attention to
the role of narratives in economic contexts. Given that the term “narrative”
has such a loose meaning, it should come as no surprise that it has received
very different formalizations. Shiller (2017) does not provide an explicit
model of what a narrative is. Instead, he regards certain terms and expres-
sions that appear in popular discourse as indications of a specific narrative
and proposes to use epidemiological models to study their spread. Benabou
et al. (2016) focus on moral decision making and formalize narratives as
messages or signals that can affect decision makers’ beliefs regarding the ex-
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ternality of their actions. Levy and Razin (2018) use the term “narrative” to
describe information structures in game-theoretic settings that people pos-
tulate to explain observed behavior.
Finally, our paper joins a handful of works in so-called “behavioral polit-
ical economics” that study voters’ belief formation according to misspecified
subjective models or wrong causal attribution rules - e.g., Spiegler (2013),
Esponda and Pouzo (2017); and see Schnellenbach and Schubert (2015) for
a survey.
2 The Model
Let X = X1 × · · · × Xn, where n > 2 and Xi = {0, 1} for each i = 1, ..., n.
For every N ⊆ {1, ..., n}, denote XN = ×i∈NXi. For any x ∈ X , the com-
ponents x1 and xn - also denoted a and y - are referred to as an action
and a consequence. These components are independently distributed. In
particular, actions have no causal effects on consequences.
Let Q be a finite set of conditional distributions over x2, ..., xn−1 that have
full support for every x1, xn. Given a pair of numbers α, µ ∈ (0, 1), define
Pα,µ ⊂ ∆(X) as the set of distributions p for which p(a = 1) = α, p(y =
1 | a) = µ for all a, and (p(· | x1, xn)) is in Q. We regard µ as a constant,
whereas α represents a historical action frequency that we endogenize below.
A directed acyclic graph (DAG) is a pair (N,R), where N ⊆ {1, ..., n} is
a set of nodes and R ⊆ N × N is a set of directed links. Acyclicity means
that the graph contains no directed path from a node to itself. We use iRj
or i→ j to denote a directed link from the node i into the node j. Abusing
notation, let R(i) = {j ∈ N | jRi} be the set of “parents” of node i. We will
often suppress N in the notation of a DAG and identify it with R.
Following Pearl (2009), we interpret a DAG as a causal model, where
the link i → j means that xi is perceived as an immediate cause of xj .
Directedness and acyclicity of R are consistent with basic intuitions regarding
causality. The causal model is agnostic about the sign or magnitude of causal
effects.
LetR be a collection of DAGs (N,R) satisfying two restrictions: {1, n} ⊆
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N , and there is no directed path from n to 1 - i.e., the consequence variable
is not perceived as a (possibly indirect) cause of the action. In all the DAGs
that appear in the examples we will examine, 1 is an ancestral node (i.e.,
R(1) = ∅) and n is the unique terminal node (i.e., n /∈ R(i) for every i ∈ N
and there is no other node with this property). However, these properties
are not necessary for our general analysis.
Narratives and their induced beliefs
Fix α, µ ∈ (0, 1). A narrative is a pair s = (p, R) ∈ Pα,µ ×R. The narrative
induces a subjective belief over ∆(XN ), defined as follows:
pR(xN) =
∏
i∈N
p(xi | xR(i)) (2)
The full-support assumption ensures that all the terms in this factorization
formula are well-defined.
The conditional distribution of xn given x1 induced by pR is computed in
the usual way. It has a simple expression when 1 is an ancestral node:
pR(xn | x1) =
∑
x2,...,xn−1
(∏
i>1
p(xi | xR(i))
)
(3)
For illustration, when the DAG is R : 1 → 3 → 4 ← 2, the narrative (p, R)
induces
pR(x1, x2, x3, x4) = p(x1)p(x2)p(x3 | x1)p(x4 | x2, x3)
and
pR(x4 | x1) =
∑
x2,x3
p(x2)p(x3 | x1)p(x4 | x2, x3)
The interpretation of this belief formation process is as follows. In a nar-
rative (p, R), the conditional distribution p(x2, ..., xn−1 | x1, xn) represents a
selection of n − 2 observable variables that are incorporated into the story.
In other words, every conditional distribution in Q is implemented by some
collection of n− 2 actual variables. The component R determines how these
variables (some or all of them) are woven into a causal structure. This is
akin to a novelist who conjures up a collection of events, and then organizes
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their unfolding according to a plot. The narrative generates a subjective
belief regarding the mapping from actions to consequences, by alerting the
audience’s attention to particular correlations - those that the causal model
deems relevant - and combining them according to the causal model. The
correlations themselves are accurate - i.e., each of the terms in the factor-
ization formula (2) is extracted from an objective distribution (over a, y and
the selected additional variables). However, the way they are combined may
lead to distorted belief, such that pR(y = 1 | a) 6= µ for some a.
Policies and anticipatory utility
Let D = [ε, 1 − ε], where ε > 0 is arbitrarily small. A policy d ∈ D is a
proposed mixture over actions, where d is the proposed frequency of playing
the action a = 1.
Given a historical action frequency α, a narrative s = (p, R) and a policy
d induce the following gross anticipatory utility :
V (s, d | α) = d · pR(y = 1 | a = 1) + (1− d) · pR(y = 1 | a = 0) (4)
Note that V is defined for a given α because the set of feasible narratives
varies with α, but also (as we will later see) because the subjective distribu-
tion pR(y | a) is not invariant to α.
A representative agent has a utility function u(y, d) = y − C(d − d∗),
where d∗ ∈ D is the agent’s ideal policy, and C is a symmetric, convex
cost function that satisfies C(0) = C ′(0) = 0. The function C represents
the agent’s intrinsic disutility he experiences when deviating from his ideal
policy. Note that if the agent had rational expectations, he would realize
that y is independent of a and find no reason to deviate from d∗. Given α,
The agent’s net anticipatory utility from the narrative-policy pair (s, d) is
U(s, d | α) = V (s, d | α)− C(d− d∗) (5)
One may wonder why there is a need to define policy as a continuous
variable, rather than identifying it with the binary action. The reason, as
usual in these cases, is that we want our model to generate a fine mapping
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from the subjective belief pR(y | a) to policies. In addition, certain interesting
effects in our model would disappear or become obscured under a binary-
policy specification.
Equilibrium
The model’s primitives are the exogenous probability of a good outcome µ,
the set of conditional distributions Q, the set of feasible DAGsR and the cost
function C. The objects Pα,µ, pR and U are derived from these primitives.
We are now ready to define our notion of equilibrium.
Definition 1 An action frequency α ∈ [0, 1] and a probability distribution σ
over narrative-policy pairs constitute an equilibrium if two conditions hold:
Supp(σ) ⊆ arg max
(s,d)∈Pα,µ×R×D
U(s, d | α)
and
α =
∑
(s,d)
σ(s, d) · d
This concept captures a steady-state in the battle over public opinion.
The first condition requires that prevailing narrative-policy pairs are those
that maximize the representative agent’s net anticipatory utility, given the
historical action frequency. Thus, public opinion’s criterion for selecting be-
tween competing narrative-policy pairs is net anticipatory utility - in other
words, it chooses the narrative it prefers to believe in. This captures the idea
that voters do not adjudicate between narratives using “scientific” methods;
rather, they are attracted to narratives with a hopeful message. The second
condition requires the historical action frequency to be consistent with the
marginal steady-state distribution over policies. The lower and upper limits
on d are thus introduced in order to ensure that α is interior.
The distribution α can be interpreted as a cross-section measurement of
the relative popularity of various policies among the public. However, we
favor an “ergodic” interpretation, according to which α describes a historical
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action frequency. Different policies are ascendant at various points in time.
A particular policy rises to dominance when the narrative that accompanies
it appeals to the public in the sense that the narrative-policy pair maximizes
the public’s anticipatory payoff. Over time, as the historical action frequency
changes, so does the anticipatory payoff induced by various narrative-policy
pairs, and therefore a different narrative-policy pair may become dominant.
The distribution α is the average action frequency that results from the
periodic swings between dominant narrative-policy pairs.
The following preliminary result establishes equilibrium existence.
Proposition 1 An equilibrium exists.
Our next basic observation provides a simple rational-expectations bench-
mark. If R is a fully connected DAG, or if it contains no directed path from
the ancestral node 1 to node n, then pR(y | a) = µ for all a - i.e. the agent’s
belief regarding the mapping from actions to consequences coincides with ra-
tional expectations. In this case, V ((p, R), d | α) = µ for every p, d, such that
deviating from the ideal policy d∗ does not produce any kick to anticipatory
utility. If R only consists of such DAGs, then in any equilibrium (α, σ), the
marginal of σ over d (and therefore α) assigns probability one to d∗. In the
next section, we will begin to see departures from this crisp benchmark when
other DAGs are admitted.
3 An Example: Foreign-Policy Narratives
Let n = 3, µ = d∗ = 1
2
, C(∆) = k∆2, where k >
√
2
4
. Take ε (in the definition
ofD) to be vanishingly small. Suppose that Q consists of a single conditional
distribution:
p(x2 = 1 | a, y) ≈ a(1− y) (6)
The approximate equality is due to an arbitrarily small perturbation of the
exact specification x2 = a(1− y), to ensure that p has full support. The set
R consists of all DAGs with two or three nodes in which a is represented by
a ancestral node.
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Interpret the three variables as follows. The action a represents foreign
policy toward a rival country with a hostile regime, where a = 1 (0) denotes
hawkish (dovish) policy. The consequence y represents the stability of the
regime, where y = 1 (0) indicates regime change (regime stability). Finally,
the variable x2 represents the strength of nationalistic attitudes among the
rival country’s population, where x2 = 1 (0) indicates that these attitudes
are strong (weak).
The joint distribution p satisfies the following properties. First, foreign
policy has no causal effect on the stability of the rival country’s regime.
Second, hawkish (dovish) policy tends to strengthen (weaken) nationalism
in the rival country. Finally, nationalism and regime stability are positively
correlated. In particular, regime change can only happen when nationalistic
attitudes are weak. Yet, this correlation is not causal; rather, it is due to
confounding by exogenous variables that are excluded from the causal models
our narrators employ.
Since Q is a singleton in this example, narrators have no freedom in their
choice of p. Consequently, a narrative can be identified with the DAG it
employs.
Claim 1 There exists a unique equilibrium (α, σ), where α ≈ 2 − √2 and
Supp(σ) consists of two narrative-policy pairs: (i) a lever narrative Rl :
a → x2 → y coupled with a dovish policy do ≈ 12 − 18
√
2
k
; (ii) an opportunity
narrative Ro : a→ y ← x2, coupled with a hawkish policy dl ≈ 12 + 18
√
2
k
.
Proof. For the sake of the calculations in this proof, we treat the approximate-
equality definition of p as if the equality were precise. We will also suppose
that the equilibrium policies are interior and given by first-order conditions.
We will later verify that the equilibrium is unique.
Consider the opportunity DAG Ro. By (3), we have
pRo(y | a) =
∑
x2=0,1
p(x2)p(y | a, x2)
We can calculate these terms under the specification (6) and the assumption
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that µ = 1
2
, and obtain
pRo(y = 1 | a = 0) = 2− α
4
pRo(y = 1 | a = 1) = 2− α
2
such that
U(Ro, d | α) = d · 2− α
2
+ (1− d) · 2− α
4
− k(d− 1
2
)2 (7)
Therefore,
∂U(Ro, d | α)
∂d
=
2− α
4
− 2k(d− 1
2
) (8)
Because this derivative is strictly positive at d ≤ 1
2
and strictly decreasing in
d > 1
2
, there is a unique policy do > 1
2
that maximizes U(Ro, d | α).
Now consider the lever DAG Rl. By (3), we have
pRl(y | a) =
∑
x2=0,1
p(x2 | a)p(y | x2)
We can calculate these terms under the specification (6) and the assumption
that µ = 1
2
, and obtain
pRl(y = 1 | a = 0) =
1
2− α
pRl(y = 1 | a = 1) =
1
2(2− α)
such that
U(Rl, d | α) = d · 1
2(2− α) + (1− d) ·
1
2− α − k(d−
1
2
)2 (9)
Therefore,
∂U(Rl, d | α)
∂d
= − 1
2(2− α) − 2k(d−
1
2
) (10)
Because this derivative is strictly negative at d ≥ 1
2
and strictly decreasing
in d > 1
2
, there is a unique policy dl < 1
2
that maximizes U(Rl, d | α). It
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follows that Supp(σ) must be some weak subset of {(Ro, do), (Rl, dl)}.
Let us first suppose that Supp(σ) coincides with this set and that do and
dl are given by first-order conditions. Then,
U(Ro, do | α) = U(Rl, dl | α) (11)
∂U(Ro, d | α) |d=do
∂d
=
∂U(Rl, d | α) |d=dl
∂d
= 0 (12)
By plugging (7)-(10) into the above equations, we can verify that they are
satisfied at the values for (do, dl, α) that are given in the statement of the
claim. The assumption on k ensures that the solution is well-defined. The
exact weights that σ assigns to the two points in the support can be extracted
from the condition α =
∑
(s,d) σ(s, d) · d.
To verify uniqueness, consider first equilibria in which Supp(σ) has two
elements. Note that U(Ro, do | α) monotonically decreases with α, while
U(Rl, dl | α) monotonically increases with α. This means that for a given
(do, dl), there is a unique α that solves equation (11). Given α, equations (11)-
(12) are linear in (do, dl) and hence, have a unique solution. It follows that
there is a unique triplet (do, dl, α) that solves (11)-(12). Now suppose that
Supp(σ) consists of a single point (Rl, d) ((Ro, d)) only. Then, α = d. In this
case, a simple calculation establishes that the narrative-policy pair (Ro, 1−d)
((Rl, 1− d)) delivers a higher net anticipatory utility, a contradiction.
This example has a number of noteworthy features.
Coupling of narratives and policies
Although there is a single available variable (other than the action and the
consequence) that narrators can incorporate into their stories, its location
in the narrative’s causal scheme depends on the direction of the policy the
narrative is meant to sustain. Thus, in order to sustain a hawkish policy
d > d∗, the narrative must treat the variable x2 as an exogenous opportunity.
In contrast, to sustain a dovish policy d < d∗, the narrative must treat the
variable x2 as a lever.
The reason that the lever narrative promotes dovish policies is that ac-
cording to p, a and x2 are positively correlated, whereas x2 and y are neg-
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atively correlated. The lever narrative puts these correlations together as if
they reflected a causal chain a→ x2 → y. As a result, pRl predicts a negative
indirect causal effect of a on y.
The intuition for why the opportunity narrative promotes hawkish poli-
cies is quite different. According to p, Pr(a = 1, x2 = 0) ≈ αµ - i.e., the
combination of a = 1 and x2 = 0 is an infrequent event. Yet the rarity is
unaccounted for by pRo , which sums over x2 without conditioning on a (and
observe that Pr(x2 = 0) = αµ + 1 − α > Pr(a = 1, x2 = 0)). At the same
time, the probability of y = 1 conditional on the combination a = 1, x2 = 0 is
approximately one: if we observe both hawkish policy and weak nationalism,
it is almost surely because the regime is unstable. The coupling of these two
effects leads to an exaggerated belief in the probability of y = 1 conditional
on a = 1.
Equilibrium polarization
The marginal equilibrium distribution over policies assigns weight to one pol-
icy on each side of the agent’s ideal point. The fundamental force behind this
polarization effect is a “diminishing returns” property of the two narratives:
their ability to deceive the agent about the effect of a on y decreases with the
historical frequency of the action they support. Thus, when we perturb α
above the equilibrium level, this makes room for the growing popularity of a
lever narrative that sustains a dovish policy. Conversely, perturbing α below
the equilibrium level increases the popularity of an opportunity narrative
that promotes a hawkish policy.
This effect can be interpreted in terms of cross-sectional political polar-
ization: At any moment in time, there are two narrative-policy pairs that
dominate public opinion. Alternatively, it can be given an “ergodic” interpre-
tation: Different narrative-policy pairs rise to dominance at different points
in time, and the distribution σ captures the long-run frequency with which
each of them is dominant.
Mutual narrative refutation
In our model, the representative agent does not reason “scientifically” about
the causal models conveyed by conflicting narratives. Rather than actively
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seeking data about p(y | a) in order to test the contending narratives, he
allows the “narrators” to determine the data he pays attention to. Thus, the
lever narrative calls his attention to the conditional probabilities p(x2 | a)
and p(y | x2), whereas the opportunity narrative calls his attention to the
marginal probability p(x2) and the conditional probability p(y | a, x2). When
evaluating a given narrative (p, R), the agent only considers the data that the
narrative calls attention to and uses it to evaluate the narrative’s anticipatory
value, via the factorization formula pR.
If our agent were somewhat less passive in his approach to data, he could
notice that the data that one narrative employs actually refutes the other
narrative. Thus, the data p(y | a, x2) referred to by the opportunity narrative
demonstrates that unlike what the lever narrative assumes, y and a are not
independent conditional on x2. Conversely, the data p(x2 | a) demonstrates
that unlike what the opportunity narrative assumes, x2 and a are not inde-
pendent. But how would the agent respond to this observation? A critical
reaction would be to distrust all narratives and develop a more “scientific”
belief-formation method. However, an equally natural reaction would be to
conclude that “all narratives are wrong” and stick to the one that makes the
agent feel more hopeful about the future - especially in the political context,
where the agent’s personal stakes are negligible.
Finally, note that this scenario would not arise in a modified version of our
example, in which there are two distinct variables with the same conditional
distribution. In this case, the two conflicting narratives could invoke different
variables, such that the above mutual refutation would be infeasible.
Hawkish bias and distortion of the status quo
For a given absolute policy distance from the ideal point d∗ = 1
2
, the opportu-
nity narrative leads to a higher anticipatory utility than the lever narrative.
As a result, the average equilibrium policy lands on the hawkish side (even
though do and dl are equally far from the ideal point) - i.e., α > 1
2
.
The fundamental reason behind this effect is that given p, the lever nar-
rative has the property that V ((p, Rl), α | α) = µ, whereas the opportu-
nity narrative satisfies V ((p, Rl), α | α) > µ. In other words, while the
lever narrative exaggerates the probability of y = 1 under a counterfactual
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dovish movement away from the steady-state policy, it does not distort the
consequences of a policy that adheres to the status quo. In contrast, the
opportunity narrative also distorts the status-quo.
This ability to spin tales not just about counterfactual events but also
about the status quo gives the opportunity narrative an advantage over the
lever narrative. A plausible criterion for refining our notion of equilibrium
is to rule out such distortions of the status quo because the public is less
likely to fall for a narrative that misrepresents the status quo. Our analysis
in the next section will involve such a restriction. In the current example,
it rules out the opportunity narrative (in fact, this is generically the case).
The following result summarizes the effect of this change on the equilibrium
analysis.
Claim 2 Suppose that R includes all the DAGs in the original specifica-
tion except a → y ← x2. Then, there exists an essentially unique equilib-
rium (α, σ), where α ≈ 5
4
− 1
4
√
9 + 2
k
, and Supp(σ) consists of the following
narrative-policy pairs: (i) a lever narrative Rl : a → x2 → y coupled with
a dovish policy dl ≈ 2 − 1
2
√
9 + 2
k
; (ii) any distribution over the remaining
DAGs in R coupled with the policy d∗.
The proof follows the same outline as in the previous claim, except that
the policy d∗ coupled with any DAG that induces rational expectations (e.g.
a → y) replaces (Ro, do). Thus, when the opportunity narrative is ruled
out, the equilibrium exhibits a dovish bias, mixing between the rational-
expectations policy d∗ and a dovish policy that is sustained by the lever
narrative.
4 Analysis
Toward the end of the previous section, we pointed out that while narratives
distort the effect of a on y, a plausible restriction is that this distortion only
involves counterfactual deviations from the steady-state policy. It is one
thing to stoke illusions about the consequences of counterfactual policies, and
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quite another to present a wrong picture about the consequences of actual
policies, because the latter can be checked against the long-run observation of
p(y). Hence, it seems sensible to restrict attention to narratives that do not
distort beliefs about the effectiveness of the status-quo policy. In this section,
we implement this desideratum by restricting the set of feasible DAGs R.
Definition 2 (Perfect DAGs) A DAG (N,R) is perfect if whenever iRk
and jRk for some i, j, k ∈ N , it is the case that iRj or jRi.
Thus, in a causal model that is represented by a perfect DAG, if two
variables are perceived as direct causes of a third variable, then there must
be a perceived direct causal link between them. E.g., 1 → 2 → 3 is perfect,
and so is the more elaborate DAG:
1 → 2 → 4 → 6
ց ↓ ր ↓ ր
3 → 5
(13)
In contrast, the DAG 1 → 3 ← 2 is imperfect because 1R3 and 2R3, yet
there is no direct link between 1 and 2.
Perfection is a familiar property in the Bayesian Networks literature. In
our context, the crucial properties of perfect DAGs are the following:
Correct marginals. Let (N,R) be a perfect DAG. Then, pR(xi) = p(xi) for
every i ∈ N . That is, the subjective distribution induced by the DAG does
not distort the objective marginal distribution over individual variables.
No status-quo distortion (NSQD). Let (N,R) be a perfect DAG. Then, V ((p, R), α |
α) = µ for every objective distribution p. That is, the DAG never distorts the
consequences of following a policy that coincides with the historical action
frequencies.
Indeed, Spiegler (2017,2018) shows that the class of perfect DAGs is the
largest that satisfies these properties for all objective distributions. This
observation can be extended: For a generic p, imperfect DAGs will violate
both properties. Thus, the significance of the restriction to perfect DAGs is
that it is necessary for the NSQD property, given a generic set Q.
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4.1 Linear Narratives
In this sub-section we investigate the structure of narratives. Specifically, we
focus on the notion of linear DAGs.
Definition 3 A DAG (N,R) is linear if 1 is the unique ancestral node, n
is the unique terminal node, and R(i) is a singleton for every non-ancestral
node.
Clearly, linear DAGs are a subclass of perfect DAGs, because by defi-
nition, no node in a linear DAG has more than one parent. Linear DAGs
capture the simplest form of narrative. They consist of a single causal chain
and correspond to the notion of stories as “one damned thing after another”.
In addition, they are simple in the sense that they only call attention to cor-
relations between pairs of variables (this property characterizes any causal
tree - indeed, linear DAGs are degenerate trees with a single terminal node).
The intuitive appeal of linear DAGs raises the question of whether there
is any loss of generality in restricting attention to them. Formally, we pose
the following question. Consider a narrative (p, R) in which R is a perfect
DAG. Is there an alternative narrative (p′, R′) in which R′ is linear (and
not larger than R, in the sense that it has weakly fewer nodes), such that
p′R′(y | a) = pR(y | a)?
Looking at the illustrative perfect DAGs at the beginning of this section,
one might get the impression that the answer is obvious. For instance, in
the DAG given by (13), we could collapse the subsets {2, 3} and {4, 5} into
a pair of ”mega-nodes” x′2 = (x2, x3) and x
′
4 = (x4, x5), such that the six-
node perfect DAG, denoted R, would be reduced to a four-node linear DAG
R′ : 1→ 2′ → 4′ → 6. However, note that for a given p, the original DAG R
induces
pR(x1, ..., x6) = p(x1, x2, x3)p(x4 | x2, x3)p(x5 | x3, x4)p(x6 | x4, x5)
whereas the reduced DAG leads to a factorization that can be written as
pR′(x1, ..., x6) = p(x1, x2, x3)p(x4 | x2, x3)p(x5 | x2, x3, x4)p(x6 | x4, x5)
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The third terms in these two expressions are different. Therefore, for arbi-
trary p, we will have pR′ 6= pR and it is not immediately obvious that we
could come up with a different p′ such that p′R′(x6 | x1) = pR(x6 | x1).
Proposition 2 For every narrative (p, R) in which R is perfect, there exists
another narrative (p′, R′) in which R′ is linear and has weakly fewer nodes
than R, such that p′R′(y | a) ≡ pR(y | a).
Thus, for every narrative (p, R) that employs a perfect DAG we can find
a (potentially different) narrative (p′, R′) in which R′ is a linear DAG with
weakly fewer nodes than R, such that the two narratives generate the same
conditional beliefs. The intermediate nodes in R′ represent variables that
are derived from the original variables via a non-trivial sequence of trans-
formations, which employs the basic tool of “junction trees” in the Bayesian
Networks literature. Therefore, p′ is typically different from p. In particular,
this means that p′ may lie outside the set Q to which p belongs. That is,
our result does not mean that the restriction to linear DAGs is without loss
of generality for an arbitrary set Q. However, if Q is sufficiently rich, linear
narratives can approximate non-linear narratives that involve perfect DAGs.
4.2 Polarization
As shown at the end of Section 2, under rational expectations (or when
R only consists of DAGs that induce pR(y = 1 | a) = µ for all a), any
equilibrium assigns probability one to the ideal policy d∗. This provides a
stark benchmark for the result in this sub-section.
Definition 4 Fix µ. A pair (Q,R) is rich if it satisfies the following two
conditions: (i) for every α ∈ (0, 1) there exists a feasible narrative (p, R),
p ∈ Pα,µ, R ∈ R, such that pR(y = 1 | a) is non-constant in a, and (ii) for
every q ∈ Q there exists q′ ∈ Q such that q′(· | a, y) ≡ q(· | 1− a, y).
Richness means that the set of feasible narratives always enables belief
distortions that favor either action. To see why it is not a vacuous property,
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recall that the lever narrative in Section 3 satisfies pR(y = 1 | a = 0) >
pR(y = 1 | a = 1). Because Q is a singleton in that example, it fails
condition (ii) in the definition of richness. Now add to Q a mirror image of
the conditional distribution given by (6), such that x2 = (1− a)(1− y) with
arbitrarily high probability. Then, as long as R includes a → x2 → y, the
pair (Q,R) is rich.
Proposition 3 Let R be a collection of perfect DAGs, such that (Q,R) is
rich. Then, in any equilibrium (α, σ), σ assigns positive probability to exactly
two policies, dr > d
∗ and dl < d∗.
Proof. Fix an equilibrium (α, σ). First, we establish that the support of
σ must include least two distinct policies. Assume the contrary - i.e., the
marginal of σ over d is degenerate. Then by definition, it assigns probability
one to the steady-state policy α. By the NSQD property of perfect DAGs,
V (s, α | α) = µ for every feasible narrative s.
There are two cases to consider. Suppose α 6= d∗. Then any narrative
(p, R) in the support of σ delivers U((p, R), d∗ | α) = µ−C(α−d∗). However,
the narrative policy pair ((p, R∗), d∗), where R∗ = a → y generates the net
payoff U((p, R∗), d∗ | α) = µ, contradicting the first part of the definition of
equilibrium. Suppose next that α = d∗. Then,
V ((p, R), d∗ | α) = d∗ · pR(y = 1 | a = 1) + (1− d∗) · pR(y = 1 | a = 0) = µ
By property (i) of richness, there is a feasible narrative (p′, R′) such that
without loss of generality, p′R′(y = 1 | a = 1) > p′R′(y = 1 | a = 0).
Therefore,
V ((p′, R′), d′ | α) = d′ · pR(y = 1 | a = 1) + (1− d′) · pR(y = 1 | a = 0) > µ
whenever d′ > d∗. Since C ′ = 0 at d = d∗, it follows that coupling the
narrative (p′, R′) with such a policy d′ that is slightly larger than d∗ will
deliver U((p′, R′), d′) > µ, a contradiction.
Now suppose that the support of σ contains at least two distinct policies.
We argue that at least two of these policies, denoted dl and dr, satisfy dl < α
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and dr > α. Note that every (s, d) ∈ Supp(σ) must deliver U(s, d) ≥ µ
because the narrative-policy pair ((p, a → y), d∗) induces U = µ. Let us
now show that the narrative (p1, R1) that accompanies the policy dr satisfies
pR1(y = 1 | a = 1) > pR1(y = 1 | a = 0), and that the narrative (p0, R0) that
accompanies dl satisfies pR0(y = 1 | a = 1) < pR0(y = 1 | a = 0).
By the definition of equilibrium, any narrative (p, R) that accompanies
any d in the support of σ maximizes
U((p, R), d | α) = V ((p, R), d | α)− C(d− d∗)
where
V ((p, R), d | α) = d · pR(y = 1 | a = 1) + (1− d) · pR(y = 1 | a = 0)
Because all feasible narratives involve perfect DAGs, any (p, R) must satisfy
V ((p, R), α | α) = µ. This means that we can rewrite V ((p, R), d | α) as
follows:
V ((p, R), d | α) = d− α
1− α · pR(y = 1 | a = 1) +
1− d
1− α · µ (14)
=
α− d
α
· pR(y = 1 | a = 0) + d
α
· µ (15)
It follows that the set of narratives that maximize U for given (d, α) only
depends on the ordinal ranking between d and α. Specifically, if d > α,
then (p, R) should maximize pR(y = 1 | a = 1); if d < α, then (p, R) should
maximize pR(y = 1 | a = 0); and if d = α, then all feasible narratives induce
U = µ−C(d− d∗). Richness implies that there is (p, R) such that the slope
of V ((p, R), d | α) with respect to d > α is strictly positive, and there is
(p, R) such that the slope of V ((p, R), d | α) with respect to d < α is strictly
negative.
It follows that the value function max(p,R) V ((p, R), d | α) is piecewise
linear in d: It is linearly increasing (decreasing) in d > α (d < α). Since C is
strictly convex, it follows that there is a unique maximizer dr of U((p, R), d |
α) in the range d ≥ α, and a unique maximizer dl of U((p, R), d | α) in the
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range of d ≤ α. In both cases, α cannot be the maximizer. To see why, recall
that U((p, R), α | α) = µ − C(α − d∗) for any narrative (p, R). We noted
above that every (s, d) ∈ Supp(σ) must deliver U(s, d) ≥ µ. It follows that
if α ∈ argmaxd U((p, R), d | α), then α = d∗. But since C ′ = 0 at d = d∗,
it follows from (14) that any narrative (p, R) with pR(y = 1 | a = 0) > 0
satisfies maxd>α U((p, R), d | α) > µ. Likewise, any narrative (p, R) with
pR(y = 1 | a = 0) > 0 satisfies maxd<α U((p, R), d | α) > µ. We conclude
that dr > α and dl < α, and therefore the support of the marginal of σ over
d is weakly contained in {dl, dr}. Because we have already established that
this support cannot be a singleton, the containment must be an identity.
It remains to establish that dr > d
∗ and dl < d∗. Assume the contrary
such that without loss of generality, dl ≥ d∗. Recall that dl is accompanied by
a narrative (p0, R0) for which pR0(y = 1 | a = 0) > 0. Therefore, the deriva-
tive of U((p, R), d | α) with respect to d is strictly negative at d = dl, which
means that switching from dl to a slightly lower policy (without changing the
accompanying narrative) would generate a higher net anticipatory utility, a
contradiction.
Thus, when the set of feasible narratives only involves perfect DAGs - yet
is sufficiently rich to enable belief distortion in either direction - equilibrium
must induce exactly two policies. Each of the two policies deviates from the
ideal point d∗ in a different direction. As the proof of the result indicates,
this polarization result does not directly rely on the notion of narratives as
causal models. Indeed, any model of belief distortion that satisfies NSQD and
richness would lead to the same result. Causal models only play an indirect
role in this sub-section: Perfect DAGs imply NSQD and non-vacuousness
of the richness property. They will return to play a direct role in the next
sub-section.
4.3 Short Narratives
In this sub-section we provide a complete equilibrium characterization for the
following specification. First, narratives must be short: They can involve at
most one variable x2 in addition to a and y. Second, R is the set of perfect
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DAGs with two or three nodes in which a is represented by an ancestral
node. The only DAG in this class that does not induce pR(y | a) = µ for all
a is the lever DAG a → x2 → y. Finally, Q is large in the following sense:
There is an arbitrarily small constant δ > 0 such that for every conditional
distribution (p(x2 | a, y)), there is a conditional distribution q ∈ Q such that
maxa,y |q(x2 = 1 | a, y)− p(x2 = 1 | a, y)| < δ.
Our analysis in the previous sub-section implies that in any equilibrium
(α, σ), Supp(σ) consists of two elements: a policy dr > d
∗ sustained by a
lever narrative that employs some distribution qr ∈ Q, and a policy dl < d∗
sustained by another lever narrative that employs a different distribution
ql ∈ Q. The following result refines this characterization.
Proposition 4 There is an essentially unique equilibrium (α, σ).3 In par-
ticular:
(i) In the δ → 0 limit, qr is defined by p(x2 = 1 | a, y) = y + a(1− y) and ql
is defined by p(x2 = 1 | a, y) = y + (1− a)(1− y).
(ii) α ∈ (1
2
, d∗) when d∗ > 1
2
, and α = 1
2
when d∗ = 1
2
.
Proof. We established in the previous sub-section that dr is accompanied
by a narrative (p, R) that maximizes pR(y = 1 | a = 1); and likewise, dl is
accompanied by a narrative (p, R) that maximizes pR(y = 1 | a = 0). The
only DAG that can induce non-constant pR(y | a) is a→ x2 → y. Therefore,
the narratives that accompany both dr and dl involve this DAG, which we
denote by R. To find the optimal narrative that accompanies dr, we need to
find the quadruple (p(x2 = 1 | a, y))a,y=0,1 that maximizes
pR(y = 1 | a = 1) =
∑
x2
p(x2 | a = 1)p(y = 1 | x2)
=
∑
x2
(∑
y′
p(y′)p(x2 | a = 1, y′)
)
µ
∑
a′ p(a
′)p(x2 | a′, y = 1)∑
y′′
∑
a′′ p(a
′′)p(y′′)p(x2 | a′′, y′′)
In the Appendix, we show that the solution in the δ → 0 limit is p∗(x2 = 1 |
3By essential uniqueness we mean that the definition of q0 or q1 is unique up to rela-
beling of x2.
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a, y) = y + a(1− y), inducing
p∗R(y = 1 | a = 1) =
µ
µ+ α(1− µ)
and, by NSQD,
p∗R(y = 1 | a = 0) =
µ2
µ+ α(1− µ)
Therefore,
V ((p∗, R), d | α) = d µ
µ+ α(1− µ) + (1− d)
µ2
µ+ α(1− µ)
= µ+
µ(1− µ)
µ+ α(1− µ)(d− α)
Likewise, the narrative that accompanies dl in the δ → 0 limit involves
the conditional distribution p∗∗(x2 = 1 | a, y) = y + (1− a)(1− y), inducing
p∗∗R (y = 1 | a = 0) =
µ
µ+ (1− α)(1− µ)
p∗∗R (y = 1 | a = 1) =
µ2
µ+ (1− µ)(1− α)
Therefore,
V ((p∗∗, R), d | α) = d µ
2
µ+ (1− µ)(1− α) + (1− d)
µ
µ+ (1− µ)(1− α)
= µ− µ(1− µ)
µ+ (1− α)(1− µ)(d− α)
Denote
Ur(α) = U((p
∗, R), dr | α) = V ((p∗, R), dr | α)− C(dr − d∗)
Ul(α) = U((p
∗∗, R), dl | α) = V ((p∗∗, R), dl | α)− C(dl − d∗)
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Denote ∆ = |d− α|, e = α− d∗. Then, we can write
Ur(α) = max
∆≤1−ε−α
[
µ+
µ(1− µ)
µ+ α(1− µ)∆− C(∆ + e)
]
(16)
Ul(α) = max
∆≤α−ε
[
µ+
µ(1− µ)
µ+ (1− α)(1− µ)∆− C(∆− e)
]
Recall that by assumption, d∗ ≥ 1
2
. Suppose α > d∗. Then, α > 1
2
and e > 0.
It is then clear from (16) that Ur(α) < Ul(α), contradicting equilibrium. Now
suppose α < 1
2
. Then, e < 0, and it is clear from (16) that Ur(α) > Ul(α),
again contradicting equilibrium. It follows that α ∈ [1
2
, d∗]. Furthermore,
since Ur(α) is strictly decreasing in α while Ul(α) is strictly increasing in α,
there is at most one value of α for which Ur(α) = Ul(α), hence equilibrium
must be unique.
The characterization has a number of noteworthy properties. First, the
lever narrative that sustains either of the two equilibrium policies selects
the intermediate variable x2 such that it is highly correlated with both the
desired outcome y = 1 and the advocated policy. Specifically, the selected
variable is such that one particular value is attained whenever y = 1 or the
favored action is taken.
For illustration, recall the US trade policy debate described in the In-
troduction. In this context, our characterization approximates the following
prevailing narratives. The lever narrative that sustains a policy with a pro-
tectionist bias (relative to the agent’s ideal point) will involve a variable like
“imports from China”, because low imports are associated with trade restric-
tions as well as with high employment in the local manufacturing sector, even
if the latter correlation is not causal but due to a confounding factor (such as
exogenous technology changes that affect outsourcing of production). Like-
wise, the lever narrative that sustains a trade policy with a liberalized bias
will select a variable like ”industrial exports”.
Second, the anticipatory utility induced by the equilibrium narratives ex-
hibits a diminishing-returns property. That is, when α increases (decreases),
the narrative that advocates right-leaning (left-leaning) policies has lower an-
ticipatory value. This property is intuitive: narratives generate false hopes
26
about counterfactual policies; as the historical action frequency leans in the
same direction as the narrative, the ability to sell this illusion diminishes. In
turn, the diminishing-returns property implies two features of equilibrium:
essential uniqueness (specifically, the marginal equilibrium distribution over
policies is unique) and a “centrist bias” (i.e., the historical action frequency
lies between 1
2
and d∗.
5 Opportunity Narratives
Our analysis in the previous section ruled out imperfect DAGs, which include
the opportunity narrative we encountered in Section 3. In this section we
explore the implication of allowing for imperfect DAGs. We focus our analysis
on the case in which only a single auxiliary variable can be used (i.e., n = 3).
Thus, the set of feasible DAGs is the set of all DAGs with up to three nodes,
in which a is represented by an ancestral node. The only imperfect DAG in
this class is a→ x2 ← y. We assume throughout that d∗ = 12 .
The following result establishes a polarization result akin to that of Sec-
tion 4.2.
Proposition 5 If (Q,R) is rich in the sense of Section 4.2, then any equi-
librium assigns positive probability to at least one policy d > d∗ and one policy
d < d∗.
Proof. Assume the contrary - without loss of generality, there is an equilib-
rium (α, σ) that assigns probability one to policies d ≥ d∗ = 1
2
. Therefore,
α ≥ 1
2
. If the DAG a → y ← x2 is never played in this equilibrium, we are
back with the model of Section 4.2, where this possibility was ruled out.
Now suppose that Supp(σ) includes a narrative-policy pair ((p, R), d) in
which R : a→ y ← x2. Let us first establish that, for one such pair, pR(y =
1 | a = 1) 6= pR(y = 1 | a = 0) . Assume the contrary for every such (p, R).
This means that if we switched to the DAG R′ : y ← x2, we would have
pR′(y) = pR(y). However, since pR′(y) ≡ p(y), we have pR(y = 1 | a) = µ for
all a. This means that the narrative-policy pair ((p, R), d) induces the same
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net anticipatory utility as if the narrative involved the DAG a → y. Since
we can perform this substitution for every narrative-policy pair in Supp(σ)
that involves the DAG a → y ← x2, we are back in the case of Section 4.2,
which again leads to a contradiction.
From now on, assume without loss of generality that for every narrative-
policy pair ((p, R), d) in which R : a → y ← x2, pR(y = 1 | a = 1) 6=
pR(y = 1 | a = 0). Suppose d = d∗. Since C is flat at this point, a
deviation to the narrative policy pair ((p, R), d′), where d′ is slightly different
from d∗ in the direction of the action a that has the higher pR(y = 1 | a)
would generate higher net anticipatory utility, contradicting the definition of
equilibrium. Therefore, d > d∗. In particular, this means that α > 1
2
. If
pR(y = 1 | a = 1) < pR(y = 1 | a = 0), a switch to the narrative-policy pair
((p, R), 1− d) would increase gross anticipatory utility without changing C,
a contradiction.
Thus, α > 1
2
and Supp(σ) includes a narrative-policy pair ((p, R), d) in
which R : a → y ← x2, d > 12 and pR(y = 1 | a = 1) > pR(y = 1 | a = 0).
Write down the explicit formula for pR(y | a):
pR(y = 1 | a) =
∑
x2
p(x2)p(y = 1 | a, x2) (17)
=
∑
x2
(∑
a′′
p(a′′)
∑
y′′
p(y′′)p(x2 | a′′, y′′)
)
p(a)(p(y = 1))p(x2 | a, y = 1)∑
y′
p(y′)p(a)p(x2 | a, y′)
= µ
∑
x2
p(x2 | a, y = 1)∑
y′
p(y′)p(x2 | a, y′)
∑
a′′
p(a′′)
∑
y′′
p(y′′)p(x2 | a′′, y′′)
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For a = 1, this expression becomes
µ
∑
x2
p(x2 | a = 1, y = 1)
α
∑
y
p(y)p(x2 | a = 1, y) + (1− α)
∑
y
p(y)p(x2 | a = 0, y)∑
y
p(y)p(x2 | a = 1, y)
= µ
∑
x2
p(x2 | a = 1, y = 1)

α + (1− α)
∑
y
p(y)p(x2 | a = 0, y)∑
y
p(y)p(x2 | a = 1, y)


= µ

α+ (1− α)∑
x2
p(x2 | a = 1, y = 1)
∑
y
p(y)p(x2 | a = 0, y)∑
y
p(y)p(x2 | a = 1, y)


Likewise, for a = 0, (17) becomes
µ

(1− α) + α∑
x2
p(x2 | a = 0, y = 1)
∑
y
p(y)p(x2 | a = 1, y)∑
y
p(y)p(x2 | a = 0, y)


Denote
A =
∑
x2
p(x2 | a = 1, y = 1)
∑
y
p(y)p(x2 | a = 0, y)∑
y
p(y)p(x2 | a = 1, y)
B =
∑
x2
p(x2 | a = 0, y = 1)
∑
y
p(y)p(x2 | a = 1, y)∑
y
p(y)p(x2 | a = 0, y)
Since pR(y = 1 | a = 1) > pR(y = 1 | a = 0), A > B. And since pR(y = 1 |
a = 1) > µ, A > 1. The net anticipatory utility generated by ((p, R), α) can
thus be written as
d · pR(y = 1 | a = 1) + (1− d) · pR(y = 1 | a = 0)− C(d− 1
2
) (18)
= µ [d(α + (1− α)A) + (1− d)((1− α) + αB)]− C(d− 1
2
)
Now consider a deviation to the narrative-policy pair ((p˜, R), 1− d), where p˜
is defined by
p˜(x2 | a, y) ≡ p(x2 | 1− a, y)
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That is, p˜ is a mirror image of p. By assumption, p˜ is feasible. Define A˜
and B˜ accordingly. By construction, A˜ = B and B˜ = A. Therefore, the net
anticipatory utility generated by ((p˜, R), 1− d) is
(1− d) · p˜R(y = 1 | a = 1) + d · p˜R(y | a = 0)− C((1− d)− 1
2
)
= µ [(1− d)(α+ (1− α)B) + d((1− α) + αA)]− C(1
2
− d)
Since d, α > 1
2
and A > 1, this expression exceeds (18), a contradiction.
Unlike the case of perfect DAGs, the DAG a → x2 ← y does not satisfy
the NSQD property, and therefore the proof resorts to other arguments. The
key question is whether, assuming all equilibrium policies lie on one side
of d∗ = 1
2
, a narrative-policy pair ((p, a → x2 ← y), d) ∈ Supp(σ) can be
destabilized by a deviation to a “mirror” pair. The answer is not obvious,
and our proof relies on the particular structure of the imperfect three-node
DAG a→ x2 ← y.
The result is weaker than its analogue in Section 4.2. In particular, we are
unable to determine whether equilibrium will sustain exactly one policy on
each side of d∗ for general cost functions. However, when costs are sufficiently
small, we obtain a stronger characterization.
Proposition 6 Suppose (as in Section 4.3) that there is an arbitrarily small
constant δ > 0 such that for every conditional distribution (p(x2 | a, y)) there
is q ∈ Q such that maxa,y |q(x2 = 1 | a, y)− p(x2 = 1 | a, y)| < δ. Then, if
C ′(·) and ε are sufficiently small, there is a unique equilibrium, in which
α = 1
2
and Supp(σ) consists of:
(i) An opportunity narrative that consists of the DAG a → y ← x2 and the
conditional distribution p(x2 = 1 | a, y) ≈ y + (1− a)(1− y), coupled with a
policy dr ≈ 1.
(ii) An opportunity narrative that consists of the DAG a→ y ← x2 and the
conditional distribution p(x2 = 1 | a, y) ≈ y + a(1− y), coupled with a policy
dl ≈ 0.4
4If d∗ > 1
2
, a similar result holds, where the only difference is that α ∈ (1
2
, d∗).
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Proof. In Section 4.3, we derived, for each a = 0, 1, a lever narrative that
sustains pR(y = 1 | a) − pR(y = 1 | 1 − a) > 0 for any given α ∈ (0, 1).
Since this difference is the derivative of V with respect to d, it follows that if
C ′ is sufficiently small, the only policies that survive in equilibrium are the
extreme points d = 1− ε and d = ε. It follows that in order to characterize
equilibrium in the low ε limit, we only need to look for the narratives (p, R)
that maximize pR(y = 1 | a) for each a = 0, 1.
In Section 4.3, we saw that the largest pR(y = 1 | a = 1) and pR(y =
1 | a = 0) that lever narratives can attain are µ/[µ + (1 − µ)α] and µ/[µ +
(1 − µ)(1 − α)], respectively. In the Appendix, we show that the largest
pR(y = 1 | a = 1) and pR(y = 1 | a = 0) that opportunity narratives can
attain are 1−α(1−µ) and 1−(1−α)(1−µ), respectively. A simple calculation
establishes that
1− α(1− µ) > µ
µ+ (1− µ)α
for any α ∈ (0, 1). It follows that the prevailing narrative-policy pairs in
any equilibrium in the ε, δ → 0 limit are as described in the statement
of the proposition. In equilibrium, these pairs must deliver the same net
anticipatory utility:
1− α(1− µ)− C(1− 1
2
) = 1− (1− α)(1− µ)− C(−1
2
)
which holds if and only if α = 1
2
.
Thus, when the set of feasible three-node DAGs is unrestricted, the set
Q is rich and the cost C is low, the narratives that prevail in equilibrium
are opportunity narratives and they sustain extreme policies. Surprisingly,
the opportunity narrative that sustains an extreme right (left) policy employs
the same third variable that was employed by the equilibrium lever narrative
that sustained the extreme left (right) in Section 4.3. We saw an inkling of
this effect in the illustrative example of Section 3: The same variable can
feature in narratives that support radically different policies; what changes
is the role that this variable plays in the narrative’s causal structure.
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6 Conclusion
The model presented in this paper formalized a number of intuitions regard-
ing the role of narratives in the formation of popular political opinions. Our
model was based on two main ideas.
What are narratives and how do they shape beliefs? In our model, narra-
tives are formalized as causal models (represented by DAGs) that describe
how actions map into consequences. Different narratives employ different
intermediate variables and arrange them differently in the causal scheme.
Narratives shape beliefs in the sense that beliefs emerge from fitting causal
models to long-run correlations between the variables that appear in the
narrative. These beliefs are used to evaluate policies.
How does the public select between competing narratives? Our behavioral
assumption was that in the presence of conflicting narrative-policy pairs, the
public (a representative agent in this paper) selects between them “hedo-
nically” - i.e., according to the anticipatory utility induced by each of these
pairs. This is consistent with the basic intuition that people are drawn to
“hopeful” stories.
The main insights that emerged as results of our formalism can be sum-
marized as follows. First, narratives are employed to “sell false hopes”: They
involve misspecified causal models that generate biased beliefs regarding the
consequences of counterfactual policies. Second, the same variable can serve
two conflicting narratives with a different causal structure (e.g., “lever nar-
rative” vs. “opportunity narrative”) in the service of conflicting policies.
Third, multiplicity of dominant narrative-policy pairs can be a fundamental
property of long-run equilibrium in the “battle over public opinion”. Indeed,
growing popularity of one policy can strengthen the appeal of a narrative
that supports an opposing policy. This “diminishing returns” property leads
to additional properties of equilibrium (uniqueness, centrist bias) in specific
settings. Finally, when we rule out narratives that convey false beliefs re-
garding the status quo, linear narratives are without loss of generality.
Our analysis leaves a number of open technical problems. First, Section
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4.3 provided a complete equilibrium characterization for perfect DAGs and
rich Q in the case of n = 3. We also know that for n = 4, equilibrium
narratives have the longer linear form a → x2 → x3 → y. Naturally, we
conjecture that for general n, prevailing narratives are linear chains of length
n. But what are the conditional beliefs over consequences that these pre-
vailing narratives induce? Finally, the case of general n and an unrestricted
set of feasible DAGs (including imperfect ones) is almost entirely open; the
only analysis we have been able to carry out for this domain is the n = 3
example of Section 4. A broad question that is common to these two cases is
whether our definition of equilibrium generates a force that favors narratives
that involve many variables.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider an auxiliary two-player game. Player 1’s strategy space is D, and α
denotes an element in this space. Player 2’s strategy space is ∆(Q×R×D),
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and β denotes an element in this space. Observe that when we fix α and µ,
an element q ∈ Q induces unambiguously an element pq ∈ Pα,µ.
The payoff of player 1 from the strategy profile (α, β) is
∑
(q,R,d)
β(q, R, d)U((pq, R), d | α)
Note that since pR is a continuous function of α, so is U . The payoff of player
2 from (σ, α) is
−
(
α−
∑
(q,R,d)
β((pq, R), d)d
)2
A Nash equilibrium in this auxiliary game is equivalent to our notion of
equilibrium. The strategy spaces and payoff functions of the two players
in the auxiliary game satisfy standard conditions for the existence of Nash
equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof proceeds in the three main steps.
Step 1: Deriving an auxiliary “clique factorization” formula
Consider a non-linear perfect DAG (N,R), where N = {1, ..., n}, n > 2. We
say that a subset of nodes C ⊆ N is a clique if for every i, j ∈ C, iRj or jRi.
We say that a clique is maximal if it is not contained in another clique. Let
C be the collection of maximal cliques in the DAG.
The following is standard material in the Bayesian-Networks literature.
Because (N,R) is perfect, we can construct an auxiliary (non-directed) tree
whose set of nodes is C, such that for every pair of nodes C and C ′ in this
tree, C ∩ C ′ is contained in any C ′′ that lies along the path that connects
C and C ′ (the path is unique, by the definition of a tree). Such a tree is
referred to in the literature as a junction tree. Given a junction tree, we say
that S ⊆ N is a separator if there are two adjacent tree nodes C and C ′ such
that S = C ∩ C ′. Let S be the set of separators for a given junction tree
constructed from C. Then, for any distribution p′ ∈ ∆(X) with full support
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that is consistent with (N,R) (i.e., in the sense that pR = p),
p′(x) =
∏
C∈C
p′(xC)∏
S∈S
p′(xS)
For an exposition of these results, see Cowell et al. (1999), pp. 52-69.
Now, our objective distribution p is not necessarily consistent with R.
However, pR is consistent with R by definition. Furthermore, a key feature
of perfect DAGs is that they do not distort the marginal distributions over
cliques - i.e., pR(xC) ≡ p(xC) for every C ∈ C (see Spiegler (2017) for further
details). It follows that for every objective distribution p and a perfect DAG
(N,R), we can write
pR(x) ≡
∏
C∈C
p(xC)∏
S∈S
p(xS)
(19)
where C is the set of maximal cliques in (N,R) and S is the set of separators
in some junction tree constructed out of C.
Let C1, Cm ∈ C be two cliques in (N,R) that include the nodes 1 and
n, respectively. Furthermore, for a given junction tree representation of the
DAG, select these cliques to be minimally distant from each other - i.e.,
1, n /∈ C for every C along the junction-tree path between C1 and Cm.
If C1 = Cm, then by our earlier observation that perfect DAGs do not
distort the marginals of collections of variables that form a clique, it follows
that pR(x1, xn) ≡ p(x1, xn) and therefore pR(xn | x1) ≡ p(xn | x1) - i.e. we
can replace the original DAG with the degenerate linear DAG 1 → n and
obtain the same subjective conditional distribution over xn. The same devi-
ation holds if there is no junction-tree path between C1 and Cm, because this
means that x1 ⊥ xn according to pR, and therefore pR(xn | x1) ≡ p(xn | x1).
Thus, from now on, assume that C1 6= Cm and there is a junction-tree
path between C1 and Cm. Enumerate all the nodes in the junction tree
and turn it into a directed tree, such that C1 is its root node. For every
k = 2, ..., |C|, let pa(k) denote the index of the direct parent of Ck - i.e. the
junction tree has a direct link Cpa(k) → Ck. In particular, let C1, C2, ..., Cm
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be the tree nodes along the path between C1 and Cm, such that this path
is C1 → C2 → · · · → Cm. By the definition of a junction tree, if i ∈ Ck, Cj
for some 1 ≤ k < j ≤ m, then i ∈ Ch for every h = k + 1, ..., j − 1. And
since the cliques C1, ..., Cm are maximal, it follows that every Ck along the
sequence C0, ..., Cm+1 must introduce at least one element i /∈ ∪j<kCj. As a
result, it must be the case that m ≤ n− 1.
Now, repeatedly apply the identity
p(xCk) = p(xCk∩Cpa(k)))p(xCk−Cpa(k) | xCk∩Cpa(k))
to (19) for every k ≥ 2, and obtain the following equivalent formula:
pR(x) ≡ p(xC1) ·
∏|C|
k=2
p(xCk−Cpa(k) | xCk∩Cpa(k))
Furthermore, by the definition of the junction tree, for every k > m, Ck −
Cpa(k) and C
∗ = C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Cm are mutually disjoint. Therefore,
pR(xC∗) ≡ p(xC1)
∏m
k=2
p(xCk−Ck−1 | xCk∩Ck−1) (20)
Step 2: Obtaining a linear-DAG factorization
We begin this step by deriving the subjective conditional probability pR(xn |
x1) from (20). Recall that from the definition of C1 and Cm it follows that
1 ∈ C1, n ∈ Cm, and 1, n /∈ Ck for every k = 2, ..., m− 1. Denote C0 = {1}
and observe that p(xC1) = p(x1)p(xC1−{1} | x1). Then,
pR(xn | x1) =
∑
xC∗−{1,n}
∏m
k=1
p(xCk−Ck−1 | xCk∩Ck−1) (21)
We can draw an immediate conclusion from this formula. Suppose that there
is some i ∈ C∗−{1, n} such that i ∈ Ck for a unique k = 1, ..., m. Then, the
variable xi appears in only one term in (21), namely p(xCk−Ck−1 | xCk∩Ck−1).
Moreover, by assumption, i ∈ Ck−Ck−1. Therefore, we can rewrite this term
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as follows:
p(xCk−Ck−1 | xCk∩Ck−1) = p(xCk−(Ck−1∪{i}) | xCk∩Ck−1)p(xi | x(Ck∪Ck−1)−{i})
This means we can rewrite pR(xn | x1) as follows:
∑
xC∗−{1,n}
∏
h 6=k
p(xCh−Ch−1 | xCh∩Ch−1)p(xCk−(Ck−1∪{i}) | xCk∩Ck−1)p(xi | x(Ck∪Ck−1)−{i}) =
∑
xC∗−{1,n,i}
∏
h 6=k
p(xCh−Ch−1 | xCh∩Ch−1)p(xCk−(Ck−1∪{i}) | xCk∩Ck−1)
∑
xi
p(xi | x(Ck∪Ck−1)−{i}) =
∑
xC∗−{1,n,i}
∏
h 6=k
p(xCh−Ch−1 | xCh∩Ch−1)p(xCk−(Ck−1∪{i}) | xCk∩Ck−1)
This is the same formula we would have if we removed i (and the links
associated with this node) from the original DAG in the first place. Therefore,
without loss of generality, we can assume that every i ∈ C∗ − {1, n} belongs
to at least two cliques Ck, k = 1, ..., m. Furthermore, by the definition of a
junction tree, these two cliques are consecutive, Ck and Ck+1. In particular,
this means that C1−C2 = {1}, Cm−Cm−1 = {n}, and Ck−Ck−1 ⊆ Ck+1∩Ck
for every k = 1, ..., m − 1. The latter observation implies that for every
k = 1, ..., m− 1, (Ck+1∩Ck)− (Ck−Ck−1) is weakly contained in Ck ∩Ck−1.
Therefore, p(xCk−Ck−1 | xCk∩Ck−1) = p(xCk+1∩Ck | xCk∩Ck−1), such that we
can replace the term p(xCk−Ck−1 | xCk∩Ck−1) in (20) with the equivalent term
p(xCk+1∩Ck | xCk∩Ck−1). Finally, perform another change in (20), by replacing
p(xC1) with the equivalent term p(x1)p(xC2∩C1 | x1). After these changes are
performed, (20) is transformed into a Bayesian-network factorization formula
with respect to a linear DAG
1→ (C2 ∩ C1)→ (C3 ∩ C2) · · · → (Cm ∩ Cm−1)→ m
This DAG has at most m+ 1 ≤ n nodes.
Step 3: Transforming the intermediate linear-DAG nodes into binary vari-
ables
For every k = 2, ..., m− 1, define zk = xCk∩Ck−1 , and let z∗k be one arbitrary
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value that the variable zk can get. (Because p has full support, at least two
values of each zk have positive probability.) Observe that
pR(y|a) =
∑
z2,...,zm−1
p(z2|a)p(z3|z2) · · ·p(zm−1|zm−2)p(y|zm−1)
is equal to
∑
z2,...,zk−1
p(z2|a) · · · p(zk−1|zk−2)
∑
zk+1
(∑
zk
p(zk|zk−1)p(zk+1|zk)
)
· · ·
∑
zm−1
p(zm−1|zm−2)p(y|zm−1)
The expression in the large parenthesis can be written as
p(zk = z
∗
k|zk−1)p(zk+1|zk = z∗k) + p(zk 6= z∗k|zk−1)p(zk+1|zk 6= z∗k)
This is the only place in the formula for pR(y|a) where zk makes an appear-
ance. Therefore, without loss of generality, we can transform zk into a binary
variable that gets the value 1 when zk = z
∗
k and the value 0 when zk 6= z∗k.
The distribution p′ over a, y and the other m − 2 binary variables is thus
derived from p via the above series of steps. The requirement that p′ has full
support is therefore satisfied because zk gets at least two values.
Missing step in the proof of Proposition 4
Let RL : a→ x2 → y. Our objective is to show that
pRL(y = 1|a = 1) ≤
µ
µ+ α(1− µ)
pRL(y = 1|a = 0) ≤
µ
µ+ (1− α)(1− µ)
in the δ → 0 limit. To derive these upper bounds, note first that
pRL(y = 1|a = 1) =
∑
x2=0,1
p(x2|a = 1)p(y = 1|x2)
Using the notation pay ≡ p(x2 = 1|a, y), pRL(y = 1|a = 1) can be rewritten
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as
[µp11 + (1− µ)p10] µ[αp11 + (1− α)p01]
(1− µ)[αp10 + (1− α)p00] + µ[αp11 + (1− α)p01]
+[1− µp11 − (1− µ)p10] µ[1− αp11 − (1− α)p10]
(1− µ)[1− αp10 − (1− α)p00] + µ[1− αp11 − (1− α)p01]
This expression is a convex combination of two expressions,
µ[αp11 + (1− α)p01]
(1− µ)[αp10 + (1− α)p00] + µ[αp11 + (1− α)p01] (22)
and
µ[1− αp11 − (1− α)p10]
(1− µ)[1− αp10 − (1− α)p00] + µ[1− αp11 − (1− α)p01] (23)
Suppose (22) is greater or equal to (23). Then pRL(y = 1|a = 1) attains
a maximum only if p10 = p11 = 1. Given this, (22) attains a maximum at
p01 = 1 and p00 = 0. At these values,
pRL(y = 1|a = 1) =
µ
µ+ α(1− µ)
and indeed, (22) is greater than (23).
Using analogous arguments,
pRL(y = 1|a = 0) ≤
µ
µ+ (1− α)(1− µ)
where p01 = p00 = p11 = 1 and p10 = 0 attain this upper bound. 
Missing step in the proof of Proposition 6
Let Ro : a→ y ← x2. Our objective is to show that
pRo(y = 1|a = 1) ≤ 1− α(1− µ)
pRo(y = 1|a = 0) ≤ 1− (1− α)(1− µ)
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in the δ → 0 limit. To derive these upper bounds, note first that
pRo(y = 1|a) =
∑
x2=0,1
p(x2)p(y = 1|a, x2)
Denote pay ≡ p(x2|a, y). Then pRo(y = 1|a = 1) is equal to
[αµp11+α(1− µ)p10+(1− α)µp01+(1− α)(1− µ)p00]µαp11
α[µp11 + (1− µ)p10] +
[αµ(1− p11) + α(1− µ)(1− p10) + (1− α)µ(1− p01) + (1− α)(1− µ)(1− p00)]µα(1− p11)
α[µ(1− p11) + (1− µ)(1− p10)]
which simplifies into
[1+(
1− α
α
)(
µp01 + (1− µ)p00
µp11 + (1− µ)p10 )]µαp11+[1+(
1− α
α
)(
µ(1− p01) + (1− µ)(1− p00)
µ(1− p11) + (1− µ)(1− p10))]µα(1−p11)
(24)
Note that this expression is a convex combination of two expressions,
µp01 + (1− µ)p00
µp11 + (1− µ)p10 (25)
and
µ(1− p01) + (1− µ)(1− p00)
µ(1− p11) + (1− µ)(1− p10) (26)
Suppose (25) is greater or equal to (26). Then (24) attains a maximum only
if p11 = 1. Given this, (25) attains a maximum at p01 = p00 = 1 and p10 = 0.
Plugging these values into (24) gives
pRo(y = 1|a = 1) = 1− α(1− µ)
and (25) is greater than (26).
By analogous arguments,
pRo(y = 1|a = 0) ≤ 1− (1− α)(1− µ)
and p01 = p11 = p10 = 1, p00 = 0 attain this upper bound. 
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